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Çѱ¹°Ç¼³°ü¸®ÇÐȸ / v.12, no.2, 2011³â, pp.121-132
BOT ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ® ÆÄÀ̳½½ºÀÇ ±ÝÀ¶±¸Á¶ ¹× Ư¼ºÀÇ Ã¤¹«ºÒÀÌÇà À§Çè¿ÏÈ­ È¿°ú
( Default Risk Mitigation Effect of Financial Structure and Characteristic in BOT Project Finance )
ÀüÀç¹ü;ÀÌÀç¼ö;ÀÌ»ï¼ö; ÇÁ¶óÀÓ±ÝÀ¶Àڻ꿬±¸¼Ò;¼­¿ï½ÃÁ¤°³¹ß¿¬±¸¿ø µµ½Ã±â¹Ý¿¬±¸º»ºÎ;LH ÅäÁöÁÖÅÿ¬±¸¿ø;
 
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BOT(Build-Operate-Transfer) ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ® ÆÄÀ̳½½º(PF: Project Finance)´Â ¹Î°£ÀÌ ÀÚº»Á¶´Þ, °Ç¼³, ±×¸®°í ¿î¿µÀ» ¸Ã°í ¿î¿µ¼öÀÔ¿¡¼­ ÅõÀÚºñ¿Í ¼öÀÍÀ» ȸ¼öÇϹǷΠ»ç¾÷ÀÇ À§ÇèÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ Á¤ºÎ¸¦ º¸È£ÇÏ¸ç »ç¾÷ÀÚµµ Ư¼ö¸ñÀûȸ»ç¸¦ ¼³¸³ÇÏ°í ºÎ¿Ü ¹× ºñ¼Ò±¸ ±ÝÀ¶À» ÅëÇØ ÀÚº»À» Á¶´ÞÇϱ⠶§¹®¿¡ 乫ºÒÀÌÇàÀÇ Ã¥ÀÓÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ º¸È£µÇ´Â Ư¡À» Áö´Ñ´Ù. ÀÌ¿Í ÇÔ²² BOT PF »ç¾÷ÀÇ ±ÝÀ¶±¸Á¶¿Í Ư¼º¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ Ã¤¹«ºÒÀÌÇàÀ§Çè ¿ÏÈ­´Â ±ÝÀ¶½ÃÀå °æ»ö, »õ·Î¿î ±¹Á¦È¸°è±âÁØ(IFRS) µµÀÔ, ±×¸®°í °Ç¼³»çÀÇ ¿ì¹ß乫 µî°ú ¸Â¹°·Á ±× Á߿伺ÀÌ ºÎ°¢µÇ°í ÀÖÀ¸³ª Çö±ÝÈ帧ÀÇ ºÒÈ®½Ç¼º°ú ¿©·¯ °è¾àÁ¶Ç×µéÀÌ À¯¹ßÇÏ´Â ºñ´ëμöÀÍÀ¸·Î ÀÎÇØ ÀüÅë ±ÝÀ¶ °æÁ¦À̷п¡ ±â¹ÝÇÑ Æò°¡°¡ ¾î·Á¿ü´Ù. ±×·¯¹Ç·Î º» ¿¬±¸´Â BOT PF °íÀ¯ÀÇ ±ÝÀ¶±¸Á¶¿Í Ư¼º¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ Ã¤¹«ºÒÀÌÇàÀ§Çè ¿ÏÈ­È¿°úÀÇ Æò°¡¸¦ À§ÇØ ¿É¼Ç°¡°Ý°áÁ¤ ¹× °ü·Ã ±ÝÀ¶ °æÁ¦ÀÌ·ÐÀ» Åä´ë·Î À̷иðµ¨À» ±¸¼ºÇÏ°í »ç·Ê¸¦ ºÐ¼®ÇÔÀ¸·Î½á BOT »ç¾÷ÀÇ À§Çè°ü¸®¸¦ À§ÇÑ ÀÌ·ÐÀûÀΠƲÀ» Á¦½ÃÇϰíÀÚ ÇÑ´Ù. ¿¬±¸°á°ú¿¡ ÀÇÇϸé BOT »ç¾÷ÀÇ ±ÝÀ¶±¸Á¶ ¹× Ư¼ºÀÌ »ç¾÷ÀÚÀÇ Ã¤¹«ºÒÀÌÇàÀ§ÇèÀ» ¿ÏÈ­½Ã۸ç ƯÈ÷ °ü·Ãº¯¼öµéÀÌ ¼öÀͼºÀ» ¾ÇÈ­½ÃŰ´Â ¹æÇâÀ¸·Î º¯È­ÇÒ ¶§ ±× È¿°ú°¡ Áõ°¡ÇÔÀ» ¾Ë ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù.
One of the advantages of BOT PF(Project Finance) is the government can be protected from risks involved in projects as the private finances, builds, and operates relevant projects. Moreover, the private may avoid outstanding responsibility in case of default thanks to BOT PF's unique financial structure and characteristics. However, despite increasing attention on risk mitigation effect of financial structure and characteristic of BOT PF to default risk with emerging controversies of capital crunch, introduction of IFRS, and contingent liabilities, valuation of default risk mitigation effect caused by financial structure and characteristics of BOT PF still seems sophisticated due to uncertain cash flows, complexly layered contracts, and their interaction. So, this paper is to show the theoretical frame to assess the default risk mitigation effect of financial structure and characteristic of BOT PF with option pricing and related financial economic theories and to provide some meaningful implications. Finally, this research shows that the financial structure and characteristics of BOT PF help mitigate the default risk and default risk mitigation effect increases as change of relevant variables on financial feasibility gets the BOT project less financially feasible.
 
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BOT ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ® ÆÄÀ̳½½º;¿É¼Ç°¡°Ý°áÁ¤ÀÌ·Ð;±ÝÀ¶±¸Á¶ ¹× Ư¼º;乫ºÒÀÌÇàÀ§Çè;BOT Project Finance;Option Pricing Theory;Financial Structure and Characteristic;Default Risk;
 
Çѱ¹°Ç¼³°ü¸®ÇÐȸ³í¹®Áý / v.12, no.2, 2011³â, pp.121-132
Çѱ¹°Ç¼³°ü¸®ÇÐȸ
ISSN : 2005-6095
UCI : G100:I100-KOI(KISTI1.1003/JNL.JAKO201116637925834)
¾ð¾î : Çѱ¹¾î
³í¹® Á¦°ø : KISTI Çѱ¹°úÇбâ¼úÁ¤º¸¿¬±¸¿ø
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