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Çѱ¹¼öÀÚ¿øÇÐȸ / v.41, no.4, 2008³â, pp.353-363
°ÔÀÓÀÌ·ÐÀ» ÅëÇÑ ³²ºÏ °øÀ¯ÇÏõ °ü¸® Àü·« µµÃâ
( Applying Game Theory for Strategy Transboundary River : the case of Han River in North and South Koreans )
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ÀÌ ¿¬±¸´Â ³²ºÏ °øÀ¯ÇÏõÀÇ ¹Ù¶÷Á÷ÇÑ °ü¸® ºñÀü°ú ¸ñÇ¥¸¦ ¼ö¸³Çϱâ À§Çؼ­ ºÏÇѰ­ÀÇ ÀÓ³²´ï »ç·Ê¸¦ ÅëÇØ ÇÕ¸®ÀûÀÎ °ü¸® Àü·«À» ¼¼¿ì´Â °ÍÀ» ¸ñÀûÀ¸·Î ÇÑ´Ù. ¹æ¹ý·ÐÀûÀ¸·Î´Â, °ÔÀÓÀÌ·ÐÀÇ Á¢±Ù ¹æ¹ýÀ» ÅëÇØ ³²ºÏÇÑ °øÀ¯ÇÏõ ¹®Á¦ÀÇ ÇØ¹ýÀ» ã¾Æº¸¾Ò´Ù. ±âÁ¸ÀÇ ³íÀǰ¡ ÁÖ·Î ³²ºÏ °£ÀÇ ºñÇùÁ¶ÀûÀÎ »óȲ ÇÏ¿¡¼­ÀÇ ´ëÀÀÀü·«À» ÁÖ¿äÇÑ °ü½ÉÀ¸·Î ÇÑ µ¥ ºñÇØ º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼­´Â º¸»óÀ» ¿¬°è½ÃŲ ÇùÁ¶°ÔÀÓÀÇ Á¢±Ù¹æ¹ýÀ¸·Î ³²ºÏ °£ÀÇ Çù·ÂÀÇ °¡´É¼ºÀ» ½Ã³ª¸®¿À¸¦ ¼³Á¤ÇÏ¿© ºÐ¼®ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ¶Ç ³²ºÏÀÌ ÃÖ¼±ÀÇ À̵æÀ» ¾òÀ» ¼ö ÀÖ´Â Çù·Â°ú º¸»óÀÇ Á¶°ÇÀ» °è·®È­ÇÏ¿© Æò°¡ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¹æ¹ý·ÐÀ» Á¦½ÃÇÏ¿´´Ù. ³²ºÏÇÑÀÌ ¸ðµÎ ÃÖ¼±ÀÇ ÆíÀÍÀ» ´©¸®´Â ¹æ¹ýÀº ºÏÇÑÀÌ ³²ÇÑ¿¡°Ô À¯·®À» ÇÒ´çÇØÁÖ°í, ³²ÇÑÀº ±×¿¡ ´ëÇÑ º¸»óÀ¸·Î ³²ºÏ °øµ¿ÀÇ ÀÌÀÍÀ» °¡Á®´Ù ÁÙ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â °øµ¿°³¹ß »ç¾÷(ÀÓÁø°­ À¯¿ªÀÇ °øµ¿°³¹ß µî)¿¡ Àû±ØÀûÀÎ ÅõÀÚ¸¦ ÇÏ´Â ¹æ¹ýÀ̶ó°í ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.
This study aims to set up the appropriate strategies for the transboundary river between South and North Korea. We took the example of Bukhan River which penetrates both Koreas to illustrate this idea, and applied Game Theory to get the solutions. Previous studies have mainly dealt with counterplan in case of confliction. On the contrary, this study has the premise that there could be much more cooperations. The analysis shows that the best choice is to develop the basin together. For example, they can make up development plan for Imjin basin which ranges from North Korea and South. As the result, South Korea can get the stable water volume in the river and North Korea can have the chances for economic revitalization.
 
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°øÀ¯ÇÏõ;°ÔÀÓÀÌ·Ð;ÀÓ³²´ï;¹°ºÐÀï;¹°ÇÒ´ç;Transboundary river;Game Theory;Imnam Dam;Water Dispute;Water allocation;
 
Çѱ¹¼öÀÚ¿øÇÐȸ³í¹®Áý / v.41, no.4, 2008³â, pp.353-363
Çѱ¹¼öÀÚ¿øÇÐȸ
ISSN : 1226-6280
UCI : G100:I100-KOI(KISTI1.1003/JNL.JAKO200814264574458)
¾ð¾î : Çѱ¹¾î
³í¹® Á¦°ø : KISTI Çѱ¹°úÇбâ¼úÁ¤º¸¿¬±¸¿ø
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